Antitrust thinking and enforcement have traditionally been firmly grounded in conventional economic models of monopoly and oligopoly market structures, all fully and inevitably constrained by the "laws" of demand and decreasing returns. The new economics of "digits," encompassing those goods (like software, books, and music) that are capable of being reduced to 1's and 0's (meaning electrons) -or what we call "digital economics" -necessarily changes antitrust thinking and enforcement. This is primarily because of two concepts, and accompanying postulates, discussed below, that have risen to prominence in economics over the past two or three decades, and have played important roles in the Microsoft antitrust trial over the past three years.
keyboard that is, supposedly, less efficient than alternative keyboards that have been developed over the last century (David, 1985) [a line of argument that has been severely contested Margolis, 1990 and 1995) ].
The Microsoft antitrust case has been a laboratory for how digital economics can play out in court. In its original antitrust complaint against Microsoft filed in May 1998, the Justice Department grounded its case in the relatively new digital economics: "Microsoft has maintained a monopoly share (in excess of 80%) of the PC operating system market over an extended period of time. The durability of Microsoft's market power in part reflects the fact that the PC operating system market is characterized by certain economies of scale in production and by significant 'network effects.' In other words, the PC operating system for which there are the greatest number, variety, and quality of applications will be selected by the large majority of PC users, and in turn writers of applications will write their programs to work with the most commonly used operating system, in order to appeal to as many potential customers as possible.
Economies of scale and network effects, which reinforce one another, result in high barriers to entry" (J. Klein, et.al, ¶ 58) .
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson affirmed both the Justice Department's and his own view of scale economies for software developers (which he developed as the trial proceeded) when he found, "What is more, once a firm had written the necessary software code, it could produce millions of copies of its operating system at relatively low cost" (Findings of Fact, 1999, ¶30) . 5 The judge concurred with the Justice Department that Microsoft has a dominant market position, well within the requirements for an antitrust trial to proceed: Microsoft possesses a dominant, persistent, and increasing share of the world-wide market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. Every year for the last decade, Microsoft's share of the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems has stood above ninety percent. For the last couple of years the figure has been at least ninety-five percent, and analysts project that the share will climb even higher over the next few years. Even if Apple's Mac OS were included in the relevant market, Microsoft's share would still stand well above eighty percent (Findings of Fact, ¶ 35).
The reason for the existence of the high barriers to entry are, according to the Justice Department (and trial judge), the self-perpetuating nature of sales to build on sales, "One of the most important barriers to entry is the barrier created by the number of software applications that must run on an operating system in order to make the operating system attractive to end users.
Because end users want a large number of applications available, because most applications today are written to run on Windows, and because it would be prohibitively difficult, timeconsuming, and expensive to create an alternative operating system that would run the programs that run on Windows, a potential new operating system entrant faces a high barrier to successful entry" (J. Klein, ¶ 3).
Moreover, the Justice Department found that key Microsoft executives appear to have understood key digital economic concepts and used them in designing the company's monopoly maintenance through winning the "browser battle." According to the Justice Department, two Microsoft executives reasoned that "the 'key factors to keep in mind' were, first, the need to increase browser share and, second, that the way to do that was: 'Leveraging our strong share on the desktop will make switching costs high (if they get our technology by default on every desk then they'll be less inclined to purchase a competitive solution . . ..)'" (J. Klein, ¶ 108) .
Hence, the Justice Department concludes, "Indeed, because of the extraordinary growth and importance of the Internet, the Internet browser market is itself a substantial source of potential profits to any company that might achieve a durable dominant position and be able to charge monopoly prices for the efficient use of the Internet or the web. The importance of the Internet and the significant public benefits resulting from its use, make the potential benefit to a monopolist and the potential economic and social cost of monopolization in this market very high" (J. Klein, ¶ 65) . Again, according to the Justice Department, the emergence of Netscape's Navigator, used in conjunction with Sun Microsystem's Java programming language that would make for a cross-platform web-based operating environment, threatened "to reduce or eliminate one of the key barriers to entry [the array of 70,000 Windows applications] protecting Microsoft's operating system monopoly" (J. Klein, ¶ 7).
The Role of Market Dominance
Historically, a firm's market dominance, measured by its share of industry sales (as the "industry" is defined for the particular case), has been an important surrogate for the firm's "market power," or ability to raise its prices to monopoly levels (or above the marginal cost of production). As Hovenkamp (1999) notes, courts have relied "on the fact that there is a positive correlation between market share and market power" (1999, p. 80) , with "market power" defined earlier as the ability of a firm "to deviate profitably from marginal cost pricing" (1999, p. 79) . 6 The courts have reasoned that the ability of a firm to deviate from marginal cost pricing is functionally related to its ability to reduce the market supply of the product below competitive levels. With the curbed supply, the market price will rise, and so will the firm's profits. Of course, if there are no other producers in the market, and none can enter because of prohibitive barriers to entry, the firm is in total control of industry output, which it alone can manipulate to maximize profits.
If the firm is merely the dominant producer, not the sole producer, then the dominant producer's ability to restrict aggregate industry supply is itself restricted by the ability of the other firms in the industry (and those who can enter) to make up for sales not made by the dominant producer. For non-digital goods (those that are material in nature and cannot be reduced to 1's and 0's), the smaller the share of the market supplied by firms other than the dominant producer, the greater the ability of the dominant producer to restrict aggregate industry supply and the greater its market power, ceteris paribus. The market power of the dominant producer in markets for non-digital goods stems in part from the fact that the existing nondominant producers face positive and increasing marginal costs of production. This means that as the non-dominant producers try to expand sales in response to the dominant producer's curb in sales, the non-dominant producer's expansion in sales is chocked off, eventually, by their rising marginal costs. The result can then be an aggregate net reduction in sales equal to the difference between the dominant producer's curb in sales minus the non-dominant producers' total expansion in sales. The market (monopoly) price charged will be set by the net reduction in industry supply and, presumably, constant demand. 7 Market share and market power should not have the same "correlation" in markets for digital goods, like operating systems, as in non-digital goods, for example, cereal or microprocessors. The reason is simple, as the Justice Department has found is the case in operating systems: the marginal cost of production is virtually zero, if not zero, and is practically constant for what is likely to be the full scope of the likely market (even when that market might be quite "large"). If the dominant producer tries to restrict production, then the other nondominant producers can expand output without their marginal production costs ever rising much above zero. (For instance, if Microsoft were to restrict sales of Windows, IBM could easily, with no added costs, expand its output of OS/2 by duplicating Microsoft's license with computer manufacturers, making the computer manufacturers responsible for transferring OS/2 to the computers sold. If the Justice Department starts with the presumption that Microsoft's marginal cost is practically zero, it would have to assume, for sake of consistency, that IBM's marginal cost is also practically zero.) Hence, in the limit cases, the collective expansion of non-dominant producers' output will fully offset the supply curb of the dominant producer, meaning that in such limit cases there would be no correlation between market share and market power. The supply response of the non-dominant producers can be fully offsetting no matter whether the dominant producer's market share is 50 percent, 80 percent, or even 99 percent. This is to say, in the case of digital goods, the relationship between market share and monopoly power would at best be discontinuous. That is, the dominant producer would have monopoly power if it had 100 percent of market sales, provided it were protected by prohibitive barriers to entry. It would have no such monopoly power if its market share were lower than 100 percent, regardless of whether it was protected by prohibitive barriers to entry. Hovenkamp (1999, p. 80) effectively recognizes this point by citing a formula original with Landes and Posner (1981, note 2, p. 945 ) that includes the elasticity of supply, as well as the elasticity of demand, as a determinant of a dominant producer's market power. 8 In that formula, as the supply (or demand) elasticity goes to infinity, the firm's market power goes to zero. With constant and virtually zero marginal cost of digital goods, the dominant producer's market evaporates, no matter what its level of dominance is, mainly because the elasticity of supply of the non-dominant producers is infinity when their marginal cost is constant and zero.
The practical consequence of this revised thinking can be seen in the Microsoft case. The
Justice Department does not seem to appreciate that its declaration in its complaint that the marginal cost of production of operating systems is practically nil and constant, belie its argument that Microsoft has market power simply because of its more than 80 percent (really upwards of 95 percent) market share. 9 The two lines of argument are inconsistent. The existence of one other operating system producer -for example, IBM with OS/2 -can totally undermine Microsoft's market power even if IBM has a trivial portion of market sales, simply because, as indicated, the non-dominant producer could supplant any reduction in sales of the dominant producer.
Perhaps non-dominant producers of a digital good do eventually, within the bounds of total market sales, face somewhat escalating marginal production costs (after all, someone may have to provide customer service, which might only be provided with non-digitized resources that are subject to increasing marginal cost 10 ). Still, the point is that dominance per se in markets does not mean as much in digital markets as in non-digital markets (say, markets for industrial goods, like cereal or cars). Put another way, to achieve any given level of monopoly power, a dominant producer in digital markets would have to have a greater market share than a dominant producer in a non-digital market. Hence, there should be less need for antitrust enforcement in digital markets, or fewer antitrust cases should be expected in digital markets, ceteris paribus.
The Measure of Market Share
Stripping "market share" as used in antitrust analysis of all its complexities, real world calculations of market sales are made by dividing the annual sales of a firm by total annual sales within the "relevant market." 11 All sales that are considered are legal sales. If Kellogg has $5 billion annual sales of cereal with the relevant cereal market defined as $10 billion of legal sales, then Kellogg has a 50 percent "market share." There is no reason to consider Kellogg's past cereal sales because cereal is perishable. There is a good reason for not including illegal sales:
Cereal "pirates" very likely would operate on a smaller scale than Kellogg and would likely face production costs per box much higher than Kellogg's and perhaps rising at a faster rate. As a consequence, it may reasonably be argued that Kellogg's "market share," as computed, can say something about Kellogg's ability to restrict sales within the cereal market and raise the prices it charges.
Digital goods are far from perishable. Indeed, there is no reason that they should ever deteriorate physically, mainly because, at their core, they are not physical. Hence, past sales of digital goods cannot be summarily dismissed as being irrelevant to calculating the market share.
Microsoft might indeed have a 90-plus percent of the operating system market when the "relevant market" is restricted to those operating systems sold each year through retail stores and computer makers for computers that employ Intel-compatible microprocessors. However, does that mean that Microsoft has 90-plus percent of all operating system "sales"? The answer is clearly no, as Reynolds (1999) has pointed out, given that the "relevant market" was so narrowly defined in the Microsoft antitrust case that it does not include the Apple Mac (because Apple computers are not Intel-compatible) or Linux (because Linux is not generally installed on computers to be used by single users).
However, the answer remains no, even when the relevant market remains restricted to
Intel-compatible computers. The reason is that past sales of Windows cannot be dismissed because they have not perished. When buyers do not upgrade their computers, they effectively "buy" their old operating system from themselves, and the price is very attractive, nothing. Their ability to effectively buy their old operating system from themselves is relevant because it is an additional check on the monopoly pricing of a dominant firm like Microsoft. In 1998, when the it gives pirates an incentive to expand their market sales. Put another way, the pirates add to the elasticity of supply that, when considered in the context of the Hovenkamp equation, lower the market power of firms computed for antitrust purposes.
Demand-Side Scale Economies
Network effects imply substantial economies of scale on the demand side of the market.
The larger the sales, the greater the value of the product to consumers, and the greater the demand. Accordingly, network firms can be expected to favor pricing strategies similar to those adopted by other firms whose market demands over time are interconnected with current sales.
For example, producers of addictive products (including cigarette makers and dealers of illegal street drugs) understand that their future demand is a function of current consumption (Becker and Murphy, 1988) . The greater the sales today of some street drug like heroine, the greater the future demand and consumption, ceteris paribus, or so "addiction" (or the resulting chemical dependency) implies. Even oil producers can face a lagged-demand link between current and future demand, given that consumers' future value of the good can be affected by capital investments and consumer choice associated with current use (Lee and Kreutzer, 1982) .
The link between current and future demand creates an incentive the producer of network goods (or addictive and lagged-demand goods) has to push its price downward. When future demand is positively linked to current consumption, any revenue forgone currently can be made up, possibly, with greater sales and, possibly, higher prices in the future. The main difference between the market for, say, heroine and oil on the one hand and digital goods on the other is that the former is subject, presumably, to positive and rising marginal production costs, which implies that producers of digital goods have a greater incentive to expand current sales than do producers of heroine and oil. Also, to the extent that all production costs are upfront, once the competitive process begins, it is likely to play out with few, if any, holds barred, given that the spoils of the market competition will go to the one that achieves market dominance. In their search for developing dominance through network effects and zero marginal production costs, below-zero prices are not unreasonable, or necessarily predatory.
Regardless of exactly how the competitive process develops, network effects imply that the long-run demand elasticity of network goods will be increased by two factors. The first factor is one that affects the demand for non-network goods as well as network goods, time. The long-run provides consumers with more time (or just opportunities) for them to seek out and switch to substitutes, which implies they can be more responsive to a price change of either a digital or non-digital good in the long run than in the short run. The second factor is unique to network goods. The short-run demand for network goods can build as consumption increases, or as the value of the good for consumers also increases, implying that the quantity response to a price change will be much greater in the long run than short run. 14 There is no such presumption of demand building on sales for non-network goods. Again, using the formula Hovenkamp cites for determining the market power of a firm, the long-run market power of firms with a given market share (and given elasticity of supply) should be less for a producer of a network good than a non-network good. The greater the network effects, the greater the elasticity of demand, a conclusion fully in line with Becker and Murphy's conclusion regarding addictive drugs, contrary to what is commonly thought (Becker and Murphy, 1988) . This means that the gap between the price a dominant network firm would choose and the competitive price would be lower. The deadweight loss for network goods should also be lower, implying a reduced interest in the prosecution of a dominant producer of a network good (with any given market share).
Network effects, combined with the prospects of market tipping, can also affect both the expectations of consumers and producers. Consumers will want to buy that good that is expected to be dominant, because it will be the good that yields the most consumer value over time. The greater the expectations of a particular's firm's dominance in the future, the greater the current demand and consumption, and the greater the likelihood of that firm's eventual market dominance. The prospects of expected future dominance and greater market demand can add to the firm's incentive to suppress its current price in two ways. First, the lower price can lead to greater consumption and greater future demand. Second, the lower current price can be considered a signal of how much the firm understands the interconnectedness of current price with future demand and dominance. It can also signal its interest in achieving future dominance and its willingness to forgo current revenues and profits for future revenues and profits. As a consequence, consumers can be expected to move to network firms that offer relatively lower current prices because of their expectation that that firm will achieve market dominance. Their expectations, encouraged by the firm's pricing strategy, can be self-fulfilling.
The demand-side scale economies embodied in network effects require some revision of antitrust thinking mainly because, conventionally, "'predatory pricing' refers to a practice of driving rivals out of business by selling at a price below cost" with the "intent -and the only intent that can make predatory pricing rational, profit-maximizing behavior -is to charge monopoly prices after rivals have been dispatched or disciplined" (Hovenkamp, p. 335) . With network effects, a firm's upfront suppressed prices can only have one intent, which is to respond to the nature of the market and price its network good so that other firms are driven out of the market (or to prevent other firms from driving it out of the market). The intent is to make consumers expect that the lower-than-marginal-cost upfront price will contribute to its eventual dominance. The price charged upfront can rationally be zero or, for that matter, negative. The firm's goal should be to maximize revenues, given that the achievement of that goal will also maximize profits.
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If the upfront pricing strategy leads to a current loss, that loss has to be offset by an improvement in its future profits, which implies rising future prices that are, eventually, above cost. However, it doesn't follow for two reasons that any rise in the future price to points above cost is necessarily a monopoly price, implying the collection of monopoly rents over time. First, any excess of the future revenue stream above production costs must be set against the upfront losses from below-cost pricing. Over the course of time, the firm may not make more than a competitive rate of return. Indeed, the firm's upfront pricing strategy, and its upfront losses, can be viewed by the firm not so much as a "loss," but rather as a necessary upfront investment, which implies that its true cost of production must incorporate that fixed investment in order to determine whether the future price is above the true production cost, considering all upfront investments, including the upfront loss.
Second, the future price might be rising, but so is demand. As a consequence, it does not follow that a rising future price is further removed from the competitive price, or closer to the monopoly price, than the lower (perhaps zero or negative) upfront price that is charged. Indeed, net consumer surplus available to buyers can be greater at higher future prices (that might give the appearance of monopoly prices, because of the suppressed upfront prices) than at the lower upfront prices. Buyers can benefit from the higher future prices (and give the appearance of charging above-cost monopoly prices) because the future "profits" encourages the network firm to suppress its upfront price and build the network. The greater the potential for future "profits,"
the greater the upfront investment the network firm would be willing to make in the form of upfront losses. Future profits will also affect the speed with which the network will develop.
The greater the speed of network development, the greater the net consumer surplus over time, and the closer the link between suppressed upfront prices and higher future prices.
Conventional antitrust thinking requires that proof of an offense of attempted monopolization contain three elements: "1) specific intent to control prices or destroy competition in some part of commerce; 2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose; and 3) a dangerous probability of success" (Hovenkamp, 1999, p. 280) . 16 The problem with using those criteria in network markets is that a single firm will very likely, given the underlying postulates about the market, dominate such markets. In addition, there is a reasonable expectation that the winning dominant firm, which ever firm that might be, will achieve its dominant position (with a greater likelihood than in markets for nonnetwork goods) by lowering its price to below-cost levels for the purpose of building the network, which can be misconstrued as "predatory" in the sense that the pricing strategy is used to achieve monopoly power, not just mere market dominance
Given the implied upfront losses from the adopted initial pricing strategy, there is not just a "dangerous probability" that the dominant producer will raise its price in the future, there is the virtual certainty that the dominant firm will do so in order to achieve the anticipated rate of return on its investment in the long-run. Furthermore, the firm that achieves dominance will very likely have had the intent of achieving its dominance by eliminating existing competitors with the upfront low prices. Otherwise, the firm could be supplanted by some other firm that also had the intent of wiping out other competitors.
Does that mean that the emerging dominant firm has, by the combination of the low early price and the higher later price, somehow constricted the size of the market for its network good as a monopolist might try to do? Not necessarily. In fact, the pricing combination could enhance market efficiency because the market is actually larger than it would otherwise be, and the "average" price charged by consumers would be lower than it otherwise would be. The reason is that with the early price reduction and the expansion of the demand, the elasticity of the long-run demand can be higher than it would have been if some other more reserved upfront pricing strategy had been used, leading to the long-run price being lower than it would if the elasticity of the long-run demand were lower. However, given conventional thinking about the correlation of market dominance and market power, there is definitely a dangerous probability that dominant network firms will be prosecuted for antitrust violations unjustly, that is to say, they may not have acted any more monopolistically (and may have acted more competitively) than other non-network firms with much lower market shares.
In conventional markets for conventional goods, a finding that a firm was capable of raising its price was sufficient to conclude that the firm presented a dangerous probability of raising its price in the future. After all, if a firm could raise its price, it would be losing collectible profits, causing the price of its stock to suffer. 17 However, the theory of networks requires that a distinction be made between the ability of a dominant producer to exploit the inelasticity of its short-run demand for greater profits and the incentive to do so, given the much higher elasticity of its long-run demand under which the network effects can build -and unravel.
A firm producing a network good must fear that an increase in the current price might lead to greater current profits, but also to an unraveling of the network in the long run, causing the firm to gain short-run profits at the expense of profits later on. The net effect of the firm seeking to exploit its current ability to raise its price could be a reduction in the market value of its stock.
In short, the dominant firm might have the ability to raise its price -which could erroneously be equated with a "dangerous probability" of the firm raising its price, because it has no incentive to do so.
Microsoft has been charged with violating both sections of the Sherman Act mainly because of its predatory pricing of Internet Explorer. It charged nothing for Internet Explorer in spite of having "spent something approaching the $100 million it has devoted each year to Indeed, the only justification the judge found was to protect the applications barrier to entry by rapidly gaining a substantial market share for Internet Explorer at Netscape Navigator's "expense," making Microsoft's business tactics necessarily "predatory." 18 Hence, the judge concluded that Microsoft posed the "dangerous probability" of achieving monopoly in the browser market. 19 What is important to note is that Judge Jackson never once indicates that the legal standard for making the "dangerous probability" assessment is affected in the least by the nature of the market for digital goods on which the case is founded. Indeed, the judge does nothing more than cite the relevant cases that lay out the conventional legal standard for "market share" and "dangerous probability." 20 While it is hard here to take issue with aspects of the judge's ruling against Microsoft (for example, his finding that Microsoft did seek to divide the operating system and browser markets in a meeting that was held June 21, 1995) , it is equally clear that using the prism of the two central postulates of digital economics, Microsoft's business tactics could be construed as having a "pro-competitive justification," as well as effect. The "effect" of Microsoft's tactics appears straightforward, a reduction in the price of the two leading browsers -Navigator and Explorer --to zero. The intent of the zero pricing of the browser may have been to destroy Netscape, as the Justice Department and judge claim, but it could also be construed as a natural competitive response to the advent of a competitive threat -Netscape -in the form of a new computer platform market that, like Windows, is presumably subject to network effects and zero marginal cost. After all, when marginal cost is zero, competitive, marginal cost pricing would dictate a zero price. Moreover, when a network is threatened, one would expect the ensuing competition to be intense because current and future profits, as well as market dominance, are at stake.
Microsoft might have an incentive to lower its price to zero (and beyond) just to ensure that its network doesn't unravel as the market tips toward Netscape's platform. The tipping could be the consequence of both applications developers and computer users moving to a new lower priced and superior standard.
Furthermore, Microsoft did not preclude a superior platform from establishing itself as the standard. It could not do so. If Microsoft were restricting sales and pricing its products like a monopolist, the task of a standard takeover by Netscape would be relatively easy, especially if
Netscape were truly a superior platform and were being sold at a competitive price. Even if
Microsoft had not charged a monopoly price for Windows, but threatened to do so in the future with a "dangerous probability," consumers could be expected to move to the Netscape standard (or some other standard). There might be switching costs for shifting, but there would also be expected "staying costs," or consumer surplus that would be surrendered to Microsoft for not making the switch to another operating system. In addition, there is no problem of the network effects being network externalities. The gains from the switching would be received by Netscape, which could be expected to cover many of the switching costs with the added long-run profits that could be received (especially if Microsoft were to produce and price like a monopolist).
Microsoft may have responded to the Netscape threat "with ferocity" [to use Netscape's founder Jim Clark's phrase (1999, p. 49) ], but that is not unexpected in a world of network and digital goods. In fact, it is expected because of the magnitude of the "prize," which is not simply for more sales, but for very possibly most, if not all, of the market that will tip toward the standard setter. Moreover, the additional sales are likely to be lucrative, given that they add nothing (or very little) to cost. 21 To keep the network together, a network sponsor for software like Microsoft has to assure applications developers that it, Microsoft (not Netscape), will continue to be the standard computer platform, thus giving them reasons to continue to refine and upgrade their applications for Windows. The advent of another potentially successful platform can unsettle their expectations, which may only be resettled by the network sponsor (Microsoft) proving that it will remain very competitive. Such proof can take the form of zero prices for product upgrades and strong reactions to competitive threats.
Do such reactions by Microsoft "lack pro-competitive justification"? They could easily be seen as the essence of pro-competitiveness, maybe not in markets for industrial, non-digital goods, but certainly in digital goods markets.
The Dominant Producer's Demand for Antitrust Enforcement
Textbook models of monopolies suggest that monopolies -and their legal counterparts, dominant producers -would be opposed to antitrust laws that are effectively enforced. After all, effective antitrust enforcement would mean lower firm prices, rents, and stock values.
However, such a line of analysis is narrowly conceived. It starts with the existence of the monopoly, and does not consider the circumstances under which a monopoly (or just dominant producer) might emerge. Firms that produce digital goods with the potential for network effects that might cover almost all, if not all, of the market have good reasons for wanting effective enforcement of antitrust laws. Such firms can reason that their network members can see the potential for the firm's potential market dominance that can give them the power to raise their prices and garner monopoly rents in the future. To build their networks, such firms would have to lower their prices for two reasons. First, they would have to lower their upfront prices to encourage the building of the network effects. Second, they would also have to lower their upfront prices even more to offset the expectation of the later monopoly pricing threat.
In the case of the operating system market, the likely dominant producer would have to temper the fears of both application developers and their software buyers, as well as their own buyers of the operating system. The operating system buyers would fear that they would have to pay monopoly prices for upgrades. Application developers would have to fear that the future curb in sales for the operating system caused by monopoly pricing would undermine their application sales, and undermine the market value of their upfront development investments.
Their fear would be all the stronger if the market for the operating system is subject to tipping (which also could mean "un-tipping," or unraveling) as buyers and application developers moved to lower priced computer platforms. Buyers of applications would have to fear that the network effects they garner by joining a particular computer platform would dissipate as application developers withdrew their support. The reduced demand for the platform would mean that the operating system firm that threatens to be a monopoly would have to lower its upfront price by more than would be the case if the operating systems buyers, applications developers, and applications buyers did not fear being subject to future monopoly pricing. Through lower upfront prices, these developers and buyers would effectively demand "pre-payment" of the monopoly rents that they fear will be extracted later.
A firm that has the potential for being a monopoly might try to handle the extant fears by committing itself to competitive, or non-monopoly, prices in the future. However, the developers and buyers have good reasons to doubt the commitment. When a network is in the early stages of development, the verbal or written commitment may not be credible, simply because of the newness of the firms and network. In addition, the developers and buyers can reason that if the commitment to price competitively into the future is honored by the parties making the agreement, then in the future, monopoly rents will be forgone and the company's stock will then be less than it could be if the monopoly rents were then extracted. Savvy investors may be able to buy controlling interest in the firm, institute monopoly prices (in overt or covert ways), generate monopoly rents, and then sell their stock for a capital gain. Realizing the lack of credibility of its commitments not to act monopolistically, the firm would naturally be interested in having third-party enforcement of its commitments that may take the form of contracts. However, contracts are difficult to make foolproof, especially when substantial monopoly rents may be at stake in finding legal ways of skirting the contractual language. Naturally, if the antitrust laws are never enforced, they may add little to the credibility of the firm's commitment not to act monopolistically. Hence, firms that might become monopolies, or just dominant producers who threaten to achieve monopoly power, can have an interest in active enforcement, especially when the enforcement is against others. 23 An array of economic and legal critics has argued that the problem with antitrust laws is that their enforcement has been perverse, meaning counterproductive. 24 With the encouragement of less aggressive competitors, antitrust enforcers have all too frequently used the laws to thwart competition, rather than monopoly." 25 If, or when, antitrust enforcement thwarts (contrary to the presumed intent of antitrust law) the emergence of lower future prices from competition among rivals for the network standard, the conventional model of competition would suggest that antitrust enforcement would lead to higher current prices. However, that would not be the case for producers of network/digital goods. Developers and consumers would anticipate smaller networks in the future, as the market shares of competitors are prevented from shrinking with the emergence of a dominant (more competitive) producer. To overcome the resistance of developers and buyers, network firms would have to charge, over time, lower prices than they otherwise would. Consumers would be getting lower prices, but it doesn't follow that they would be "better off." This is because their demand for the size networks that are achieved would be lower, leaving them a smaller consumer surplus.
Complementary Goods
Conventional models of monopoly that undergird antitrust enforcement start with the presumption that the monopoly good is sold in isolation from all other goods. Indeed, for a pure monopoly, all substitutes are ruled out by assumption. The typical presumption is that the monopoly (or just dominant producer) does not produce complementary products, nor does it have an incentive to produce complementary products that other firms do not have --unless such products can be used to fortify the monopoly. As noted, the trial judge in the Microsoft case has found that Microsoft's development of its browser, which can only be construed as a complementary software product to Windows (given that the browser can be integrated into Windows), had one overriding purpose, to protect the applications barrier to entry into the operating system market. Accordingly, the browser's zero price was declared to be "predatory." Office would be more inclined to develop its applications for alternative operating systems, for example, Linux, or so it has been argued.
Our purpose here is not to contest the theories underlying the proposed breakup that was adopted by the trial judge. Rather, our purpose is to introduce two points about complementary products that were sidestepped in the Justice Department's case against Microsoft, perhaps because the lawyers and economists at the Justice Department hold to conventional antitrust lines of thinking about why firms do what they do.
First, it must be noted that a monopoly (or just dominant producer) in conventional analysis will always produce and price where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, thus extracting monopoly rents. However, that is not necessarily true for a monopoly with complementary products, especially one that dominates the market for complementary products, as does Microsoft.
Granted, the monopoly owner of a digital good will seek to maximize revenues, which in itself will lead to maximum profits, mainly because marginal cost is zero, but this is only when it does not have complementary products. By lowering the price of the monopolized products to some point below the monopoly price, the firm might lose revenues in the market for the monopoly products. However, it will increase the demand for the complementary digital product that can then be sold in greater numbers at a higher revenue-maximizing price. The stronger the complementarity of the products, the lower the price of the monopoly good. The greater the number of complementary products, the greater the incentive the monopoly has to lower the price of its product. Moreover, the greater the concentration of the complementary products market, the greater the incentive the monopoly firm has to lower its monopoly price. (If the market for the complementary products is highly fragmented among a number of producers, the increased sales of the monopoly product will lead to few sales of the monopoly's complementary products.) This means that the greater the monopoly's share of the complementary products market, the greater the increase in demand and price of the complementary products.
In all of the testimony in the Microsoft case, no one on the Justice Department's side thought to suggest that a plausible explanation for why the price of Windows is so low is its complementary products, perhaps most importantly, Office, given its 90 percent or higher share of the suites market. The Justice Department could have made the point that Microsoft was extracting a monopoly price, not through Windows, but rather through the sales and price of Office (if in fact that was the case).
There is a second, perhaps more important, reason Microsoft has complementary products like Office. We return to the legitimate fear of applications developers that a dominant producer of an operating system will exploit its monopoly power at some point in the future.
The applications developers would have to worry that an increase in the price of Windows will lower the demand for their complementary products that are necessarily complements to the operating system (given that the applications are technologically tied to the operating system).
This means the value of their upfront investment in the development of their applications would be lost. The lower the incentive Microsoft has to charge less than the monopoly price, the greater the risk that the application developers incur. This means, as explained above, the developers' risk costs of writing for the operating system dominant producer is functionally related to how many complements the dominant producer has, how strong the complementary relationship is, and the concentration of segments of the applications market controlled by the dominant producer in the operating system.
In other words, by Microsoft having market dominance in a major software market like productivity suites, the company provides a form of self-enforcing contact to applications developers. Put another way, Microsoft gives applications developers some assurance that it will not exploit any monopoly power it achieves in the operating system market, which is to say that Microsoft's own complementary products reduce the risk cost incurred by applications developers that, in turn, can give rise to more developers being willing to write for Windows and that, in turn again, can translate into a greater demand for Windows. Consumers may pay higher prices (although this is not certain) for software products, but that does not mean they are worse off. The size of the network can expand with the reduction in the developers' risk cost, as can consumer surplus value. Contrary to conventional antitrust thinking, no monopoly pricing need be involved.
Indeed, the elimination of Microsoft's complementary products through a breakup can have consequences that could be construed as contrary to the purpose of antitrust enforcement.
The breakup along the lines that Judge Jackson has ordered could take away Microsoft's incentive to lower the price of Windows below the monopoly price, which is to say that a higher price for Windows would be encouraged. Moreover, the breakup could increase the risk costs incurred by applications developers, reducing their willingness to write for Windows and curbing the network effects and consumer benefits.
Network sponsors like Microsoft must stand ready to defend the network, not only because of their direct interest in retaining control over the standard for, say, operating systems, but also because they must defend the interests of the applications developers who also have an economic interest in a stable standard. The applications developers do not want their investments undercut by destabilizing threats to the network. Seeing the network shrink with the advent of a new entrant (or just the threat of a new entrant), developers will understandably consider redeploying their applications for what looks to be the next new "big thing," or standard. Developers must also be concerned that other developers are thinking the same way and that the cumulative effects of such thinking across applications developers -especially when the number of developers is large (as Microsoft has 26 ) --can give rise to an accelerating decline in the network, which can feed on itself. Accordingly, the network sponsor has a strong incentive not only to defend the network with efforts that are in proportion to the threat of entrance, but disproportionately to it. In other words, the network sponsor has an incentive to meet the lighting of a competitive "match" with the lighting of its own "welding torch," just to maintain confidence that it, the network sponsor, will defend the interests of the applications developers.
This line of argument can be used to reinterpret events at the heart of the Microsoft antitrust case. As the trial evidence shows, the Microsoft Corporation did not recognize the Internet threat in the form of Netscape's Navigator to its operating system market until late 1994 or early 1995 (Findings of Fact, ¶ ¶ 17, 71, and 72). In a long May 1995 memorandum to his executive staff ominously titled "The Internet Tidal Wave" that was then marked "confidential,"
Gates radically upgraded company-wide interest in and commitment to the Internet, outlining Internet players and noting that the proposed network computer was a "scary possibility" (Gates, 1995, p. 1) . Because Navigator, along with Sun's Java programming language, was at the heart of the Internet threat, Microsoft undertook an intense campaign to develop its own browser with the obvious intent of making sure that Internet Explorer would be technologically superior to Navigator, the purpose of which was, naturally, to gain market share from Navigator. The company then bundled Internet Explorer with Windows, eventually integrating Internet Explorer into Windows. Moreover, it gave away the browsing technology and tried to tie up an array of distribution outlets (computer manufacturers and Internet service providers, for example) to maximize IE's market share.
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Were these actions predatory, the natural response of a monopoly trying to protect its market dominance, or were they competitive? The Justice Department and trial judge obviously concluded they were predatory and anti-competitive. However, the perspective we have developed offers a contrary, and more charitable, view of Microsoft's actions: they were procompetitive, the type of actions that a dominant producer would take to respond to a competitive threat in a market beset with network effects and a miniscule marginal cost of production.
Microsoft's tactics were, without question, aggressive, but perhaps also necessary to assure network members, consumers and applications developers, that Microsoft, the network sponsor, stood ready to protect the operating system standard and their interests. The "ferocity" of Microsoft's response was attributable in part to the existence of the 20,000 applications developers (not so much to the count of applications per se). Had Microsoft had far fewer developers, like so many other software firms have, then the competitive response would have been more tempered. However, that would have meant that the price charged would have been higher.
Role of Cartels
Conventional cartel models hold that the colluding firms form cartels to restrict production and raise their prices and collective profits. The presumption is that cartels have an interest in hiking prices in both the short and long run. However, according to conventional analysis, cartels have a difficult time holding to their production agreements, as evident in the history of the unstable OPEC cartel agreements. The greater the number of colluding firms, ceteris paribus, the greater the incentive cartel members have to cheat on their production agreements, and the less likely the colluding firms will charge monopoly prices and earn monopoly rents, or the more likely the cartel agreement will break down into competitive pricing.
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Network/digital economics forces revisions in the way cartels are expected to behave.
Most prominently, with network effects, competitors initially have an incentive to collude with the intent of lowering, not raising, prices in order that the development of the network will be encouraged and the future demand for the product will rise, perhaps along with the price. If there is cheating in this initial period, it will come in the form of members breaking with the cartel and raising their prices, not lowering them. By raising its price each member will increase its current revenue at the greater expense of reducing market demand and cartel revenue in the future. But the additional current demand is captured entirely by the member that raises price and the future loss is spread over all members of the cartel. If such cheating is insufficient to prevent the cartel from eventually establishing a valuable network, the members will then have the standard cartel incentive to restrict sales. However, because the market will have expanded between the short and long run, the incentive to enter the market in the long run will be greater than it was in the short run, especially if the cartel members do restrict sales. In effect, by colluding initially to lower prices and expand the market, the cartel members encourage entry and, hence, encourage price-increasing cheating in the short and price-cutting cheating in the long run. Their collusive efforts undermine, as in conventional cartel thinking, their incentive to form the cartel in the fist place.
In conventional markets, cartels are unambiguously harmful to consumers. That is not necessarily the case in markets for digital/network goods. In spite of higher anticipated prices in the future, consumers could want cartel agreements to stick, mainly because of the lower initial prices and the benefits from a larger network. And because of the problems of cartels holding to their agreements, consumers could prefer the emergence at the start of a single (if only dominant) producer of the network product. With the emergence of such a producer, the more likely the initial price will be lowered and the faster and more complete will be the development of the network, market demand, and consumer surplus. Indeed, the more aggressive a firm is in developing its dominance (say, by charging nothing for its product or paying consumers to take the product), the greater the development of the network, demand, and consumer surplus.
However, given the way antitrust enforcers interpret business tactics (as was true in the Microsoft case), the more aggressive the actions of the dominant producer initially, the more likely the dominant firm would be charged with "predation."
Efficiency from the Exploitation of Locked-in Customers
Any time a customer acquires experience with a product there is a degree of "lock-in" since shifting to another product requires some adjustment. In the case of a new brand of toothpaste this adjustment is trivial and the term "lock-in" is a clear overstatement. In the case of other products, such as electronic organizers or word processing programs, the adjustments can be significant quite apart from any network considerations, as new skills have to be learned and existing routines discarded. And when network effects are present the costs of shifting out of a product that is part of a large network of users to one that is currently being used by few can be quite high. The term "lock-in" can be meaningfully applied in this latter case, and does permit a firm to charge a higher price than would otherwise be possible.
But just as people commonly make misleading statements about the term "shortage" by discussing it without reference to price, so it is impossible to usefully discuss the term "lock-in" without reference to price. As with a shortage, lock-in allows a higher price to be charged, but the higher the price the less the lock-in. So a firm that is in a position to exploit consumers who are "locked-in" to its network has to show some pricing restraint to avoid losing the leverage that makes higher prices possible, leverage that can unravel quickly in response to competing firms anxious to develop alternative networks.
Of course, consumers should want firms that are in positions to exploit "lock-in" through higher than competitive prices to do so, at least to some degree, since without such "exploitation" firms would lack the motivation to develop networks that significantly benefit consumers through a rise in market demand and consumer surplus. Network effects "lock-in" customers in much the same way that employers "lock-in" employees with so-called "efficiency wages" --wages that provide workers with sufficient rents that employers can benefit from imposing additional demands on those employees and reduced employee turnover. 29 Sure, consumers of a network product may be charged more than otherwise, but they are more than compensated by the network benefits. Looking at the higher price charged by a network monopolist while ignoring the network benefits is just as misleading as looking at the additional demands placed on workers while ignoring the higher wages that more than compensate for those demands. Just as efficiency wages create efficiencies that are shared between employer and employee in ways that increase the welfare of both, so the higher product prices motivate efficiencies through network effects that are shared by both producer and consumer.
There are some who would agree with our discussion as far as it goes, but argue that it doesn't go far enough to consider a serious inefficiency that can arise through "lock-in" effects.
When dealing with network effects, the process by which we come to favor (and become "locked-in" to) some products can be very path dependent. The toothpaste we favor is little affected by the sequence in which we, or others, try different types of toothpaste. This is not the case with network goods. If enough people begin using one product then, because of the network effect, that product becomes more valuable than another product that comes available even through the latter product is superior. If everyone switched to the new product it would be preferred and everyone would be better off, but no one consumer has the motivation to make such a move unilaterally. So, the argument goes, consumers can easily take a path that locks them in to an inferior product even though a superior product is available. This possible inefficiency from network goods is worth considering in more detail, but, as we shall argue, it is more likely to be overcome by market incentives than by antitrust action.
Multiple Outcomes
Brian Arthur, whose pioneering work has led to renewed interest in network effects, argues that economists have traditionally founded their economic models on an assumption of diminishing returns for one overriding reason, the theoretical attractiveness of the models:
"Diminishing returns imply a single equilibrium point for the economy, but positive feedbackincreasing returns -makes for many possible equilibrium points" (Arthur, 1990, p. 92) . He has also argued with elaborate mathematical models, "There is no guarantee that the particular economic outcome selected from the many alternatives will be the 'best' one. Furthermore, once random economic events select a particular path, the choice may become locked-in regardless of the advantages of the alternatives" (Arthur, 1990, p. 92 ).
The feedback effects that can give rise to increasing returns, and multiple outcomes, include anything that can lead to a reduction in production costs, such as "learning by doing" and network effects. And Arthur sees network effects that extend well beyond the interdependency of operating system sales and applications that has been central to the examples we have used.
He also sees feedback effects in the markets for typewriter keyboards, which we have considered, and VCR recording formats. According to Arthur, the VCR market started with the VHS and Beta formats. A large number of recorders that used one or the other format would lead to video stores carrying more of those kinds of tapes, which would then feed the demand for recorders for that kind of format. Hence, "a small gain in market share would improve the competitive position of one system and help it further increase its lead" (Arthur, 1990, p. 116) .
He concludes that the early market gains for the VHS format "tipped" the market toward the VHS format, making it the ultimate dominant format. Not only was it impossible for anyone to know when the competition began which format would ultimately "win," it is possible that the "superior" format did not win the struggle for market dominance. Indeed, Arthur surmises that "the claim that Beta was technically superior is true, then the market's choice did not represent the best economic outcome" (Arthur, 1990, p. 116) . Instead of the outcome depending on product superiority, there is a good chance that the outcome will be dependent upon chance events that favor one product or the other, or the outcome favors, as Arthur quotes Alfred
Marshall's Principles of Economics approvingly, "whatever firm gets a good start" (p. 116).
Because of space limitations, we do not wish to take up the issue of whether Arthur is correct in theory or practice. At the same time, we note that other economists have found serious flaws in the reported history of the two major examples of markets that Arthur and other use, the keyboard and the VCR format Margolis, 1990 and 1995a; xxx) . It does not now appear that the products that came to dominate their respective markets, QWERTY in keyboards and the VHS in recording formats, are indeed the inferior products they have been thought to be.
For purposes of argument, we accept the contention that increasing returns can yield multiple outcomes and that, from time to time, the competitive process might result in inferior products being selected that have some durability.
The issue of concern for this paper is how those prospects might affect antitrust thinking and enforcement. This issue is of some concern because antitrust enforcement is grounded in the fear that firms with market dominance will exert their monopoly power on production and prices, and the increasing returns/feedback literature is replete with arguments that those firms that get the better starts will come to dominate their markets. Should antitrust enforcement be used to attack dominant firms with the intent of increasing the frequency with which "superior" outcomes are chosen, or decrease the frequency with which "inferior" outcomes result? Can it be used for that purpose with some probability of success, on balance? To understand the problem, we must first note that while an inferior product might become dominant, there is nothing in the feedback/network effects literature that says how frequently inferior outcomes will occur. It might be very infrequent. We must also note that even Arthur starts with a humbling acknowledgement, "Yet it would be impossible at the outset of the competition to say which system would win, which of the two possible equilibria [in the VCR market] would be selected" (Arthur, 1990, p. 116) .
The problem of picking the winner in other markets with far more than two possible outcomes would be even more problematic. Then there is the prospects that if an inferior outcome were selected --meaning that the present value of the benefits of switching to a new outcome were greater than the switching costs, properly discounted, for years to come -there are at least some grounds for believing that in some, if not all, of the inferior outcomes, a correction is likely, given that there would be net gains that could be garnered by entrepreneurs who have the foresight to engineer the switchover (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995a) .
Still, we might concede the prospects of true market failure, in which the network effects are true network externalities. Problems remain with using antitrust enforcement, or any other form of regulation, to improve upon market outcomes, given that antitrust enforcers will have to sort through all the various possible outcomes to select the one outcome that would be superior to the one chosen by market forces. It is doubtful that the enforcers would have the required information to make the assessment of relative merits of outcomes after the fact, but less before the fact. Equally difficult is knowing how the enforcers would be able to determine the costs and benefits of outcomes that never occurred. It would appear that any contemplated antitrust attack on a dominant producer because of its dominant winning market position would also have repercussions on how the competitive process would work itself out. Such antitrust prosecutions might in fact deter inferior outcomes from occurring, but given the prospects of antitrust mistakes, they could also discourage superior outcomes from occurring. The firm that expects to be the eventual winner in the competitive process may, fearing antitrust prosecution, temper its competitiveness, thus giving an "inferior firm" a "better start" than it would otherwise have, a greater prospect of being the winner, in spite of the fact that it has an inferior product. If, as
Arthur postulates, we cannot know the outcome of a freewheeling competitive process, can we know better the net effect -whether there is, on balance, an improvement or degradation in outcomes -of antitrust enforcement intended to "improve" outcomes?
The Justice Department clearly adopted the theory of "feedback effects" in its antitrust
case against Microsoft. It shows signs in its case that it also accepted Arthur's extension, that a market like the operating systems market, if left alone, could lead to an inferior outcome, especially if a firm like Microsoft with an already "good start" used its market muscle to discourage entry by a competitor like Netscape that might have had a superior product. Microsoft could definitely choke off its competitiveness, but there is no guarantee that under those circumstances the "superior" outcome would then emerge.
Concluding Comments
The advent of network and digital economics poses no threat to conventional microeconomic models of markets. As recognized, demand curves in the network and digital 2 A graphical model for production of a digital good is much like the usual textbook model for a "natural monopoly."
The main difference is that in the conventional natural monopoly model, the long-run marginal cost of production is assumed to decline steadily throughout the relevant range of the market, which gradually pulls the average production cost downward. In the case of a pure digital good (one in which all costs are upfront), the average cost, and thereby marginal cost, for the first unit produced initially equals the upfront cost. However, the marginal cost of production from the first unit on is zero, meaning the marginal cost curve runs along the horizontal axis. The average cost curve falls precipitously at first and becomes asymptotic to the horizontal axis.
3 Brian Arthur, who has written a number of the pioneering articles on network effects and increasing returns has drawn a distinction between goods with diminishing and increasing returns:
I would update Marshall's insight [that which firm achieves market dominance depends on "whatever firm gets a good start"] by observing that the parts of the economy that are resourcebased (agriculture, bulk-goods production, mining) are still for the most part subject to diminishing returns. Here conventional economics rightly holds sway. The parts of the economy that are knowledge-based, on the other hand, are largely subject to increasing returns (1990, p. 95) .
4 Not all "network effects" are necessarily "network externalities," as is sometimes suggested in the literature (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . Many networks have sponsors, meaning that the externalities are internalized, meaning there are no resulting market inefficiencies (Liebowitz and Margolis, n.d.) .
5 Judge Jackson also found that network effects pose what he called a "chicken and egg problem" for software developers: "The ability to meet a large demand [because of scale economies in supply] is useless, however, if the demand for the product is small, and signs do not indicate large demand for a new Intel-compatible PC operating system. To the contrary, they indicate that the demand for a new Intel-compatible PC operating system would be severely constrained by an intractable "chicken-and-egg" problem: The overwhelming majority of consumers will only use a PC operating system for which there already exists a large and varied set of high-quality, full-featured applications, and for which it seems relatively certain that new types of applications and new versions of existing applications will continue to be marketed at pace with those written for other operating systems. Unfortunately for firms whose products do not fit that bill, the porting of applications from one operating system to another is a costly process. Consequently, software developers generally write applications first, and often exclusively, for the operating system that is already used by a dominant share of all PC users. Users do not want to invest in an operating system until it is clear that the system will support generations of applications that will meet their needs, and developers do not want to invest in writing or quickly porting applications for an operating system until it is clear that there will be a sizeable and stable market for it. What is more, consumers who already use one Intelcompatible PC operating system are even less likely than first-time buyers to choose a newcomer to the field, for switching to a new system would require these users to scrap the investment they have made in applications, training, and certain hardware" (Findings of Fact, ¶30). 6 Hovenkamp reports how the Fourth Circuit Court specified the market share requirements in cases involving an attempted monopolization of a market: "(1) claims of less than 30% market shares should presumptively be rejected; (2) claims involving between 30% and 50% shares should usually be rejected, except when conduct is very likely to achieve monopoly or when conduct is invidious, but not so much so as to make the defendant per se liable; (3) claims involving greater than 50% share should be treated as attempts at monopolization are also satisfied" (M&M Medical Supplies and Service v. Pleasant Valley Hospital as cited in Hovenkamp, 1999, p. 285) . Hovenkamp then cites a number of cases in which "most other courts use numbers in the same range, with a few indicating that a rising market share is a stronger indicator of sufficient market power" (Hovenkamp, 1999, p. 285, notes 35 and 26) . 7 Conventional, non-digital goods, like cereal and hair dryers, are made of "real stuff." Such typically goods take some labor and some material in both the first and last unit produced, and every unit in between. Labor and material resources are significant in the distribution of such goods. There are typical resource constraints that ultimately give rise to rising marginal production (and reproduction) costs that, at some point, choke off further expansion of production. Digital goods are different. Real resources are used in the development of the first unit (of the software program, album of songs, book, and movie) produced. In the case of a computer operating system, it takes labor and material to write the strings of 1's and 0's that form the operating system. However, beyond the first unit, little or no labor and material are required. The 1's and 0's become electrons that are themselves, for the most part, "material-less" and require little space to store (because only a master copy is needed), and that require no more than the touch of a button to reproduce and distribute.
The nature of digital goods does not eliminate the cost of entry, but their nature certainly reduces costs. After all, no inventory of components must be held (the 1's and 0's can be reproduced ad infinitum from nothing), an inventory of the product need not be held, and the shipping in many directions at once can be more or less instantaneous and at the cost of ever declining telephone calls. Netscape founder Jim Clark notes how software production is so much less costly to produce than industrial goods, "In comparison [to industrial age goods], the manufacture of software is no big deal. The idea, the design, and the engineering are all done in the same place, by the same people. The basic materials are laughably cheap. No spot-welding robots need apply. All you need is a good brain and an okay computer (though some people have managed surprisingly well by reversing those adjectives)" (1999, p. 83) .
If firms are deterred from entry by production costs, then surely the entry barrier for digital goods is lower than the entry barrier for their non-digital counterparts. A firm might be the dominant producer, or even a single producer, but that firm has to worry about the loss of its market position to a greater extent than does a producer of a non-digital good with a similar dominance. The reason is that all the programmers in the world are potential competitors, given that the basic material --1's and 0's, which are available worldwide --is "laughably cheap" and that digital goods can move across national borders with relative ease. Hence, market dominance does not count for as much in markets for digital goods as non-digital goods. Producers of digital goods should therefore be less subject to antitrust prosecution than producers of non-digital goods. . A firm's "market share" is normally viewed as its sales divided by industry sales (as the industry is defined for purposes of the case at hand). In the case of Exhibit 1, Microsoft's "market share" is something quite different, the percent of existing personal computers (not annual sales) that have Windows installed on them. 10 Even if Dell provides service support for Windows, any decreasing returns it faces in service can feed into Microsoft's decision making, given the highly competitive nature of the computer manufacturing industry and how Dell's added support costs can reduce the price Dell is willing to pay for Windows.
11 Hovenkamp (1999, p. 82) defines the "relevant market" as "the smallest grouping of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently low that a firm with 100% of that grouping could profitably reduce output and increase price substantially above marginal cost." monopoly owner of a plot of land. If the owner tried to sell the land piecemeal, he would have to lower the price on each parcel until all the land was bought, which means the owner would have to charge the competitive price: the price where the demand for the land and the supply of the land come together. It might be thought that the sole owner of land would be able to restrict sales and get more than the competitive price. However, buyers would reason that if the monopoly owner eventually wanted to sell the remaining land, it could only be sold at less than the price of land already sold, which means the buyers who bought the land at the high price would suffer a loss in the market value of their land. This means that the buyers would wait to buy until the price came down, but then the owner would sell nothing at the monopoly price, and would only be able to sell the land at the competitive price. Although Coase's thesis was founded on land, a good more durable than an operating system like Windows, the argument remains applicable, mainly because the core substance of Windows may be 1's and 0's, but those 1's and 0's are highly durable. Old versions of Windows need never physically degrade. The Coase thesis suggests that the durability of Windows is one reason Microsoft must seek prices lower than the monopoly price. In addition, Microsoft has to charge even lower prices just to ensure that users of old versions will consider switching to the new version. Microsoft has to charge prices below monopoly levels because it competes aggressively with itself, just like the sole landowner who contemplates selling off parcels of land to competing buyers. Microsoft must give Windows users a good reason to actually make the switch to the new version.
The Justice Department wants the court to believe that Microsoft had no good business reason to integrate Internet Explorer into Windows 98 --other than to predate against Netscape. There's one very good reason Microsoft must do something like integrate an important new feature --for example, an Internet browser --every time it comes out with a new version of Windows: it must give its customer base --its network --a good reason to spend even a modest sum of money for the new version. When Microsoft was contemplating the construction of Windows 98, it was obvious to just about everyone in the computer industry, including people at Netscape and Microsoft, that the Internet would play an important role in the future of computing. Microsoft had to move aggressively toward making Windows useful in the emerging Internet world and thereby give its customer base a reason to move to Windows 98. Microsoft also had to give its customers a good reason not to move toward rival operating systems that could easily emerge.
The court stresses that Microsoft's monopoly power is self-evident from the fact that when it brings out a new version of Windows, it raises the price of old versions. "In a competitive market," Judge Jackson writes, "one would expect the price of an older operating system to stay the same or decrease upon the release of a newer, more attractive version" (Findings of Fact, ¶62) The judge once again succumbs to industrial-era economic thinking: that "old goods" left in inventory should be sold off at the highest price possible, which usually means at a substantial discount. However, copies of Windows are not kept in inventory. They actually do not exist until the point of sale and are transferred to new computers electronically. There is a good reason Microsoft raises the price of old versions of Windows to the price of the new version: it wants to move its existing and prospective network members to the new and improved version and the new and improved network, which can have network benefits as programmers can reduce their attention to old versions. Again, what can be seen as a move of a monopolist against its users can actually be a benefit for everyone involved in the network, which is all the more reason for us to ask: Do we really want the Justice Department and the courts deciding on software content and pricing strategy when they obviously don't understand the market forces they are observing at work? 26 Microsoft estimates that there are 20,000 developers writing for Windows, the source of the 70,000 applications that make up the judge's so-called "applications barrier to entry" (according to Scott Fallon, Microsoft Corporation, as reported to Richard McKenzie in an email exchange from September 13, 2000 through October 5, 2000 . McKenzie has questioned the existence of 70,000 applications (2000) . Both he and Fallon agree that many of the applications counted in the so-called "applications barrier to entry" have minimal sales and, thereby, are of no consequence to a firm that seeks to take over a portion of the operating system market, especially if Microsoft restricts its sales in order to charge above competitive prices (McKenzie, 2001, epilogue) . 27 Judge Jackson found, "As soon as Netscape released Navigator on December 15, 1994, the product began to enjoy dramatic acceptance by the public; shortly after its release, consumers were already using Navigator far more than any other browser product. This alarmed Microsoft, which feared that Navigator's enthusiastic reception could embolden Netscape to develop Navigator into an alternative platform for applications development. In late May 1995, Bill Gates, the chairman and CEO of Microsoft, sent a memorandum entitled 'The Internet Tidal Wave' to Microsoft's executives describing Netscape as a 'new competitor 'born' on the Internet.' He warned his colleagues within Microsoft that Netscape was 'pursuing a multi-platform strategy where they move the key API into the client to commoditize the underlying operating system.' By the late spring of 1995, the executives responsible for setting Microsoft's corporate strategy were deeply concerned that Netscape was moving its business in a direction that could diminish the applications barrier to entry" (Findings of Fact, ¶ 72).
28 See Posner (1976, chap. 4) . 29 For discussions of the "efficiency wage," see Akerlof (1982) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . 30 In its original complaint, the Justice Department argued, "Because of its resources and programming technology, Microsoft was well positioned to develop and market a browser in competition with Netscape. Indeed, continued competition on the merits between Netscape's Navigator and Microsoft's Internet Explorer would have resulted in greater innovation and the development of better products at lower prices. Moreover, in the absence of Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct, the offsetting advantages of Microsoft's size and dominant position in desktop software and Netscape's position as the browser innovator and the leading browser supplier, and the benefit to consumers of product differentiation, could have been expected to sustain competition on the merits between these companies, and perhaps others that have entered and might enter the browser market" (Complaint, ¶11). 31 For example, consider these two passages: 1) "Thus, Microsoft began, and continues today, a pattern of anticompetitive practices designed to thwart browser competition on the merits, to deprive customers of a choice between alternative browsers, and to exclude Microsoft's Internet browser competitors" (Complaint, ¶12). 2) "…Microsoft intends now unlawfully to tie its Internet browser software to its new Windows 98 operating system, the successor to Windows 95. Microsoft has made clear that, unless restrained, it will continue to misuse its operating system monopoly to artificially exclude browser competition and deprive customers of a free choice between browsers" ( ¶19). 32 Judge Jackson found, "Many of the tactics that Microsoft has employed have also harmed consumers indirectly by unjustifiably distorting competition. The actions that Microsoft took against Navigator hobbled a form of innovation that had shown the potential to depress the applications barrier to entry sufficiently to enable other firms to compete effectively against Microsoft in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. That competition would have conduced to consumer choice and nurtured innovation. The campaign against Navigator also retarded widespread acceptance of Sun's Java implementation. This campaign, together with actions that Microsoft took with the sole purpose of making it difficult for developers to write Java applications with technologies that would allow them to be ported between Windows and other platforms, impeded another form of innovation that bore the potential to diminish the applications barrier to entry. There is insufficient evidence to find that, absent Microsoft's actions, Navigator and Java already would have ignited genuine competition in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. It is clear, however, that Microsoft has retarded, and perhaps altogether extinguished, the process by which these two middleware technologies could have facilitated the introduction of competition into an important market" (Findings of Fact, ¶411).
